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.
EVADING THE No CHILD LEFT BEHIND AcT: 
STATE STRATEGIES AND FEDERAL COMPLICITY 
Evan Stephenson • 
INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Department of Education (Education Department) has the 
legal duty to implement the three-part vision of the No Child Left Behind 
Act (NCLB or the Act). 1 Under NCLB, all public school students must 
progress toward I 00 percent proficiency in math and reading within a 
twelve-year period ending in 2014. 2 Student proficiency is to be 
determined bX uniform statewide tests. 3 These tests must be 
"challenging," meaning that they align with state educational 
standards. 5 Second, NCLB requires that student test improvement must 
progress evenly over time. 6 Third and finally, NCLB ensures that 
disadvantaged students may not be left behind under the Act's 
accountability mandates. 7 In this respect, racial and ethnic minorities, 
limited English speakers, the poor, and disabled students must progress 
as the overall general students. To ensure that these student subgroups 
' Law Clerk, Hon. John M. Rogers, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 2005-06. 
J.D., Univ. of Va., 2005. I would like to thank Terri Schwartzbeck, Jared Jacobs, Jeff Bennion, 
Tristen Stephenson, Brent Olson, Ed Stephenson, Jared Berg, Yvonne Stephenson, and Professor 
Charles J. Goetz for their insightful comments. Thank you also to Professor Jim Ryan, who oversaw 
and inspired this piece. 
I. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 (Supp. 2002); see Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def Council, 
Inc., 46 7 U.S. 837, 842 ( 1984) ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for 
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress."). 
2. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (b)(l )(A)-( B) (requiring that all students be included in the state 
accountability system); id. at§ 6311(b)(I)(F), (b)(I)(G)(iv), (b)(3)(A). See also Rod Paige, Key 
Policy Letters Signed hy the !Oducation Secretary or Deputy Secretary, 
http://www.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/ secletter/020724.html (July 24, 2002). 
3. 20 U.S.C. § 63ll(b)(3)(A), (C). 
4. !d. at§§ 6301, 6311(b)(I)(A). 
5. !d. at§ 6311(b)(1 )(D)(ii). 
6. !d. at § 63ll(b)(2)(H)(i) (providing that intermediate goals tor meeting NCLB's 
requirements shall "increase in equal increments over the period covered by the State's timeline"). 
7. !d. at§ 6311 (b)(2)(C)(v)(l), (ll)(aa)-(dd); 34 C.F.R. § 200.13. 
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keep pace, states must track their subgroups' test results separately. 8 
Notwithstanding its duty to implement this three-part vision, the 
Education Department has approved three devices that can each be used 
to evade a part of the Act's aims. These devices allow states to inflate 
their student proficiency statistics, thereby minimizing the likelihood of 
falling subject to the Act's harsh sanctions for inadequate test 
performance. 9 Furthermore, these devices lessen states' incentives to 
accomplish the same ends by allowing them to use the (more harmful) 
alternative of lowering educational standards. 10 
The first device allows states to evade NCLB's vision of evenly 
distributed progress over time by "backloading" their planned student 
proficiency gains. 11 This device, or Balloon Schedule, named for its 
similarity to "balloon mortgage" repayment schedules in which payments 
swe\\ (\.e., ba\\oon) \n tne \ater )'Cars,12 a\\ows a state to scne<.\u\e tne 
majority of student P.roflciency gains for the second half of NCLB's 
twelve-year timeline. 13 For example, Wyoming, Georgia, and thirteen 
other states have scheduled two-thirds of all student proficiency gains in 
the last four years of the twelve-year timeline. 14 Seven other states have 
scheduled the majority of such gains for the latter half of the timeline. 15 
The second device can be used by states to evade NCLB's 
mechanism for watching over disadvantaged subgroups. The Education 
Department permits states to exclude selected schools' subgroups from 
their statistical reports by electing to raise the minimum number of 
students that must belong to a subgroup in each school before it is 
tracked for accountability purposes (referred to below as selection of 
minimum subgroup sizes). 16 For instance, Missouri's minimum subgroup 
size for racial and ethnic minorities is thirty. 17 Thus, a Missouri school 
8. !d. 
9. S~:e injra sec. ll.A-II.D. 
I 0. See inji·a sec. III. 
II. See infra sec. !.C.-J.D. 
12. A backloaded increase structure is "not unlike a balloon mortgage, leaving the heaviest 
lifting to those who will be in office long after the designers of that state's plan have departed the 
scene." Chester E. Finn, Jr. & Frederick M. Hess, On Leaving No Child Hehind, 157 Pub. Interest 
35, 43 (Fall 2004 ). 
13. This definition is adapted from the Education Department's own description of the 
strategy. S~:e U.S. Dept. Educ., infra n. 56 (noting that "Alaska and a number of other states, 
including Ohio and Arizona, created a trajectory that is more aggressive in the second half' of the 
timeline). 
14. See infi·a tbl. 1 (derived from U.S. Dept. Educ., Approved State Accountahilitv Plans, 
http:// www.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplans03/index.html (accessed Feb. 23, 2006)). 
15. S~:~: infra tbl. I. 
16. See infra sec. I.F.I. 
17. D. Kent King, Missouri Consolidated Stale Application Accountahililv Workbook 28, 
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with twenty-nine or fewer minority students will not be required to 
separately account for these students' test performance. Under some 
circumstances, perhaps that choice could be justifiable. Suppose, 
hypothetically, that Missouri wanted to strategically exclude certain 
special education subgroups from its statistical accountability reports. 
Missouri could do so by merely raising the minimum subgroup size for 
disabled students high enough that few schools would have enough 
disabled students to trigger separate reporting. For whatever reasons, 
Missouri has set a relatively high minimum subgroup size of fifty for the 
disabled. 18 
The third and final device allows states to avoid the Act's chief aim 
of 100 percent proficiency. 19 States can escape the 100 percent 
proficienczb goal by calculating their statistics using confidence 
intervals. A confidence interval is a statistical device that defines a 
"margin of error. " 21 Schools may be considered NCLB-compliant when 
they reach state proficiency goals minus the margin of error. 22 
Hypothetically, if a state's proficiency goal is 100 percent and its margin 
of error is eight percent, the state's schools may be considered compliant 
if they reach only ninety-two percent student proficiency. With such 
cushioning of their statistics, schools may never have to reach 100 
percent proficiency, or any goal leading there. 
This article examines the possible motives of states and the federal 
government in crafting these devices, their legality, and their probable 
effects on educational standards. Ultimately, this article furnishes 
evidence that pressure from NCLB to rapidly achieve 100 percent 
student proficiency encourages states to lower their educational 
standards, and that the Balloon Schedule, selection of minimum 
subgroup sizes, and confidence intervals have the benefit of releasing 
states from some of this pressure that was arguably intended by the Act. 
Part I offers background on NCLB and its goals, and examines in 
detail three devices that states have used to evade the Act, with particular 
emphasis on the Balloon Schedule. Part II shows that states have adopted 
these devices to minimize their schools' exposure to NCLB's harsh 
sanctions for inadequate test performance. Part II further argues that the 
Education Department has approved the use of these devices in part to 
save the Act from its own unrealistic requirements and probably also as a 
http:// www.cd.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplans03/mocsa.pdf (updated July 5, 2005). 
18. /d. 
19. See infi·a sec. I.F.2. 
20. !d. 
21. !d. 
22. !d. 
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means of preventing NCLB from being considered a failure. Part lii 
demonstrates that the Balloon Schedule, selection of minimum subgroup 
sizes, and the use of confidence intervals, though at odds with NCLB's 
vision, reduce the pressure on states to define proficiency down by 
lowering their educational standards. To this extent, these devices are 
good for educational standards in America. 
I. THE BALLOON SCHEDULE AND OTHER DEVICES: 
DEFINITIONS AND ILLUSTRATIONS 
A. NCLB 's Time line for 100 Percent Student Proficiency 
in Math and Reading 
In January 2002, President George W. Bush announced that as a 
result of the newly-passed No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 23 
"America's schools will be on a new path of reform, and a new path of 
results."24 These new results are supposed to include an increase in the 
level of student academic achievement and elimination of the 
"achievement gap" between children of various backgrounds. 25 In 
crafting NCLB, lawmakers assumed that every child could score 
proficiently on tests 26 and that a key to student success is setting high 
. 27 
expectatiOns. 
23. 20 U.S.C. ~~6301-7941. 
24. Andrew Rudalevigc, The Politics of No Child /.efi Behind, 3 Educ. Next 62, 63 (Fall 
2003) (available at http://www.educationncxt.org/20034/pdf/62.pdf). 
25. See 20 U.S.C. § 630 I (Statement of Purpose); 34 C.F.R. § 200.13(a)( I )--(2) (emphasizing 
the necessity of meeting academic standards and closing the achievement gap); Alex Duran, Factors 
to Consider When Evaluating School Accountability Results, 34 J.L. & Educ. 73, 74 (2005); James 
E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Lefi Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 932, 932 
(2004). 
26. See George W. Bush, The Essential Work of1Jemocracv, 86 Phi Delta Kappan 114 (Oct. 
2004) ("These reforms were entitled No Child Left Behind (NCLB) to rctlect my belief that every 
child can learn. When expectations are high, America's children will rise to meet them."): George 
W. Bush, Speech, Remarks to the National Urban League Confi'rence (Oct., Mich., July 23, 2004), 
in 40 Wkly. Comp. Pres. Docs. 1365 (July 26, 2004) ("The philosophy of the No Child Left Behind 
Act says every child can learn. (W]c expect every child to learn and we expect you to show us 
whether or not every child is learning."); Michael Dobbs, Former Math Teacher Recalculates No 
Child Leji Behind Initiative, Wash. Post Al9 (Mar. 16, 2004) (quoting Assistant Education Secretary 
Raymond Simon saying the "only thing that is intlcxible about [NCL13] is the idea that every child is 
capable of learning"). 
27. See Bush, The Essential Work of D<'mocracv, supra n. 26; George W. 13ush. Speech, 
Remarks hy the President in "'Ask President Bush .. F. vent (Fond Du Lac, Wis., July 14, 2004), in 
White House Press Releases and Documents (available at 2004 WLNR 2541352) [hereinafter Bush, 
Remarks]; Jay Matthews, To Educators, "No Child Goals Out of Reach .. Wash. Post A 12 (Sept. 16, 
2003) (quoting former U.S. Education Secretary Rod R. Paige). 
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NCLB ambitiously orders states to ensure that all students in affected 
schools test proficiently (with proficiency defined by each state) in math 
and reading within twelve years or by the school year ending in 2014. 28 
Accordingly, every state has submitted an accountability workbook to 
the Education Department, delineating a schedule of the state's student 
proficiency goals for specific years. 29 The Department has provisionally 
30 
approved all of these workbooks. 
NCLB requires states to set one annual measurable objective (AMO) 
applicable to each school, consisting of a percentage of students who 
must test proficiently. 31 AMOs are a component of adequate yearly 
progress (A YP), a phrase signifying whether a school meets all of 
NCLB's annual student improvement requirements. 32 For example, 
Virginia's plan requires seventy percent (the AMO) of its middle school 
students to test proficiently in reading on state tests in 2005, 2006, and 
2007. 33 Seventy percent is thus a Virginia AMO for those years. If, 
hypothetically, only sixty-nine percent of students in a Virginia middle 
school test proficiently in 2007, then that school would fail to achieve 
this AMO and would also fail to make A YP for that year. 
The AMO must also be independently achieved by the following 
four student subgroups in each school: the economically disadvantaged, 
limited English proficiency speakers, "major" racial or ethnic minorities, 
and the disabled. 34 If a school as a whole or any of its subgroups fails to 
achieve the AMO, the whole school fails to make A YP that year. 35 
28. 20 U.S.C. 9 63ll(b)(I)(A)-(B) (requiring that all students be included in the state 
accountability system); !d. at 9 63ll(b)( I )(F), (b)(l )(G)(iv), (b)(3)(A). 
29. See infra n. 50 and accompanying text. 
30. The Education Department provisionally approved all 50 state plans, including those 
laying out the Balloon Schedule. See U.S. Dept. of Educ., Press Releases: President Bush, Secretary 
Paige Celebrate Approval of Every State Accountability Plan under No Child Left Behind, http:// 
www.ed.gov/news/prcssrelcases/2003/06/06102003.html (June 10, 2003); William J. Erpenbach et 
at., Statewide Educational Accountabili(v under No Child Lefi Behind 3 (Council of Chief St. Sch. 
Officers 2003) (available at http://www.ccsso.org/publications/details.cfm?PublicationiD=215; 
select Download Free PDF(s) now) (observing that all the states' plans have been provisionally 
approved). 
31. NCLB commands states to establish "statewide annual measurable objectives" towards 
total proficiency by 2014.20 U.S.C. 9 63ll(b)(2)(G). These must be the "same for all schools and 
local education agencies in the state." 20 U.S.C. § 63ll(b)(2)(G)(ii). They also must consist of a 
"single minimum percentage of students" who must score proficiently. 20 U.S.C. § 
63ll(b)(2)(G)(iii). See also 34 C.F.R. § 200.18. 
32. See 20 U.S.C. § 63ll(b)(2)(B) (C) (setting forth the definition of "adequate yearly 
progress"); 34 C.F.R. § 200.14. 
33. See inji·a tbl. I. 
34. 20 U.S.C. § 63ll(b)(2)(C)(v)(l), (ll)(aa)-(dd); 34 C.F.R. § 200.13. 
35. 20 U.S.C. § 63ll(b)(2)(C). This is true unless the Act's safe harbor provision applies, 
which is unimportant for this discussion. See 20 U.S.C. § 631l(b)(2)(1)(i) (safe harbor provision). 
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Hypothetically, if in 2007 only sixty-nine percent of a Virginia middle 
school's special education (i.e., disabled) students test proficiently in 
reading, then that school would fail to make A YP for that year-even if 
every other student in the school scored proficiently. 36 
As guidance for setting AMOs, the Act requires states to choose a 
"starting point" based on either the proficiency rate of the state's lowest 
performing subgroup or the proficiency rate of the school ranked at the 
state's twentieth percentile in student proficiency. 37 The difference 
between the starting point and l 00 percent comprises the total percentage 
in student proficiency to be gained. 38 States must also determine the 
school years in which the percent proficient will increase. 39 Goals for 
increased proficiency are "intermediate goals."40 NCLB mandates that 
"[ e ]ach State shall establish intermediate goals for meeting the 
requirements, including measurable objectives ... that shall increase in 
equal increments over the period covered by the State's timeline." 41 The 
first such increase must occur no later than 2005, with later increases 
delayed no longer than three years. 42 Of course, AMOs and intermediate 
goals must place every school on a path toward I 00 percent student 
proficiency by 2014. 
B. "Continuous and Substantial" Student Progress Forbids the Balloon 
Schedule 
NCLB requires student improvement to be evenly distributed over 
time. The Act and regulations repeatedlj emphasize that student progress 
must be "continuous and substantia/,"4 reflecting Congress's intent that 
states' timelines distribute proficiency gains evenly and not backload 
them. The intermediate goals of Arkansas and South Carolina for middle 
school reading are good examples of evenly scheduled proficiency 
36. See e.g. Mark Goldberg, Test Mess 2: Are We Doing Better a Year Luter~, 86 Phi Delta 
Kappan 389 (Jan. 2005) ("In North Carolina, more than 90'% of schools arc meeting the state growth 
goals, but only 47"/c, of schools made A YP. Of those that failed, 283 missed the federal goal because 
one subgroup fell below its proficiency level."). 
37. See 20 U.S.C. § 63ll(b)(2)(E) ("Each State, using data for the 2001~2002 school year, 
shall establish the starting point for measuring, under subparagraphs (G) and (H), the percentage of 
students meeting or exceeding the State's proficient level of academic achievement on the State 
assessments under paragraph (3) and pursuant to the timeline described in subparagraph (F)."). See 
also id. at§ 631l(b)(2)(E)(i)~(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 200.16. 
38. See supra nn. 32~37 and accompanying text. 
39. See it?fra nn. 40-41, 46~47 and accompanying text. 
40. 20 U.S.C. § 631I(b)(2)(H). 
41. !d. 
42. See id. 
43. See 20 U.S. C.§ 63ll(b)(2)(C)(iii), (b)(2)(C)(v); 34 C.F.R. 200.13(b)(3). 
!57] EVADING NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT 
44 growth. 
" 100 
·G xo 
t;:: 
0 60 ~ 
E 40 
"' ~ 20 
"' 0.. 0 
Figure l: Straight-Line and Stair-Step Schedules 
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Year 
e Arkansas Mid-School Reading Goals from Table I 
So. Carolina Mid-School Reading Goals from Table I i 
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Arkansas uses an annually increasing straight-line schedule, and South 
Carolina opts for tri-annually increasing stair-steps. 45 Both schedules 
have trend lines that share the same slope and both distribute gains 
evenly over the timeline's first and second halves. 
To specifically forbid the Balloon Schedule, Congress included 
language in the Act that limits states' flexibility in setting intermediate 
goals. AlthouRh states may schedule such goals annually, bi-annually, or 
tri-annually,4 such goals must facilitate progress "over the period 
covered by the State's timeline" in "equal increments."47 One state's 
2003 NCLB workbook acknowledges that this statutory language 
expresses Congress's intent to forbid backloading of proficiency 
increases: "The Congressional intention [in] using [the 'equal 
increments'] language was to ensure that no State waited until near the 
end (~{the timeline and then expected enormous, unrealistic growth in the 
last two or three years. " 48 "Continuous and substantial" improvement 
facilitated by "equal" intermediate goals over the timeline, therefore, 
refers to even distribution of proficiency gains and prohibits the Balloon 
Schedule. 
44. Infra tbl. I . 
45. Arkansas and South Carolina have the same starting point (eighteen percent) for 
intermediate/middle school reading. See infra tbl. I. 
46. See 20 U.S.C. ~ 6311(b)(2)(H). 
47. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(H)(i). 
4g. See Ill. St. Bd. Educ., Accountahilitv Workhook Originally Adopted in June 2003 9, http:// 
www.ed.gov/admins/lcad/account/statcplans03/ilcsa.pdf(revised Aug. 23, 2005) (emphasis added). 
164 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2006 
C. Many States Have Adopted the Balloon Schedule 
Instead of evenly distributing their proficiency gains as required by 
the Act,49 many states have backloaded student proficiency increases. 
Table I on the next page shows the states' AMOs and intermediate goals 
for intermediate/middle school reading, as contained in the states' 2003 
accountability workbooks. 50 Table I identifies, by italics, the many 
states that have arguably used the Balloon Schedule in their 2003 
accountability workbooks. Five plans lacked sufficient AMO information 
for inclusion in the table. Of the forty-five remaining plans, twenty-two 
evidence the Balloon Schedule. 
49. See supra sec. I. B. 
50. Table I compiles data from the fifty states' 2003 approved accountability workbooks as 
posted on the Education Department website. See U.S. Dept. Educ., Approved State Accountability 
Plans, http://www.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplans03/index.html (accessed Feb. 23, 2006). 
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Table 1: 2003 State Accountability Workbooks 
Intermediate/Middle School Readin£ Proficiency Goals and Increases 
Year, 0/o Proficient 
02-start 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 
I Alabama* -- X X X X X X X 
2 Alaska 64 64 64 70 70 70 76 76 76 82 88 94 100 
3 Arizona 31 31 31 43 43 43 54 54 54 66 77 89 100 
4 Arkansas 18 25 32 39 45 52 59 66 73 80 86 93 100 
5 California 14 14 14 24 24 24 35 46 57 68 78 89 100 
6 Colorado 75 75 75 81 81 81 87 87 87 94 94 94 100 
7 Connecticut 62 62 62 72 72 72 81 81 81 91 91 91 100 
8 Delaware* -- X X X X X X X X 
9 Florida 31 31 31 48 48 48 65 65 65 82 82 82 100 
10 Geor!!ia NA 60 60 67 67 67 73 73 73 80 87 93 100 
II Hawaii 30 30 30 44 44 44 58 58 58 72 72 86 100 
12 Idaho Not Enough Information 
13 Illinois 40 40 40 48 48 55 63 70 78 85 93 93 100 
14 Indiana* -- X X X X X X 
15 Iowa 61 61 61 68 68 68 74 74 74 81 87 94 100 
16 Kansas 51 51 51 63 63 63 76 76 76 88 88 88 100 
17 Kentucky 46 46 46 51 56 62 67 73 78 84 89 95 100 
18 Louisiana '? 37 37 47 47 47 58 58 58 68 79 89 100 
19 Maine 35 35 35 42 42 42 50 58 67 75 83 92 100 
20 Maryland* -- X X X X 
21 Mass. 71 71 76 76 81 81 85 85 90 90 95 95 100 
22 Michigan 31 31 31 43 43 43 54 54 54 66 77 89 100 
23 Minnesota 70 70 70 73 76 79 82 85 88 91 94 97 100 
24 M ississiQQi 30 30 30 48 48 48 65 65 65 83 83 83 100 
25 Missouri 18 39 59 80 100 
26 Montana Not Enough Information 
27 Nebraska 61 61 61 71 71 71 81 81 81 91 91 91 100 
28 Nevada 37 37 37 48 48 48 58 58 69 69 79 90 100 
29 New Hamp. 60 60 60 70 70 70 80 80 80 90 90 90 100 
30 New Jersey 58 58 58 66 66 66 76 76 76 87 87 87 100 
31 New Mexico* -- X X X X X X X X X X X X 
32 New York* -- X X X X X X X X X X 
33 N. Carolina 69 69 69 77 77 77 84 84 84 92 92 92 100 
34 N. Dakota 61 61 61 71 71 71 81 81 81 90 90 90 100 
35 Ohio* -- X X X X X X 
36 Oklahoma Not Enough Information 
37 Oregon* -- X X X X X X 
38 Pennsylvania 45 45 45 54 54 54 63 63 63 72 81 91 100 
39 Rhode Island 68 68 68 73 73 73 79 79 79 84 89 95 100 
40 S. Carolina 18 18 18 38 38 38 59 59 59 79 79 79 100 
41 S. Dakota 65 65 65 71 71 71 77 77 77 83 88 94 100 
42 Tennessee Not Enouvh Information 
43 Texas 47 47 47 54 54 60 60 67 73 80 87 93 100 
44 Utah 65 65 65 71 71 77 77 83 83 89 89 95 100 
45 Vermont* -- X X X X 
46 Virginia 61 61 61 70 70 70 80 80 80 90 90 90 100 
47 Washinpton 30 36 42 48 53 59 65 71 77 83 88 94 100 
48 W. Virginia Not Enough Information 
49 Wisconsin 61 I 61 61 68 68 68 74 74 74 81 87 94 100 
50 Wyominv 35 35 35 45 45 45 56 56 56 67 78 89 100 
*This state initial_lydcsivnatcd the years for improvement (n1arkcd as "x") without exact -,-oals. 
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For example, from 2003 to 2008-the first half of the Act's 
timeline-Georgia expects its middle-school reading proficiency rate in 
each school to increase from sixty percent to seventy-three percent, a 
thirteen percent jump. But from 2009 to 2014-the timeline's second 
half-Georgia anticipates a much bigger increase from seventy-three 
percent to one hundred percent, a twenty-seven percent leap. Although 
Georgia's six intermediate goals are all about seven percent51 and are 
thus equal to each other, only two are scheduled for the first half of the 
timeline, while four are scheduled for the second half. 52 Rather than 
distributing its proficiency gains evenly over time, Georgia has 
scheduled about twice as much growth for the timeline's final half, and 
has therefore backloaded its gains by timing intermediate goals unevenly. 
Figure 2 on the followin~ page illustrates the Balloon Schedule as 
used by Wyoming and Maine. 3 
51. The total amount of Georgia's combined proficiency increases-forty percent (i.e., the 
I 00 percent final goal minus the sixty percent starting point)~-divided by six (the number of 
intermediate goals selected by Georgia) equals six and two-thirds. Georgia rounded up to seven 
percent f()r all of its intermediate goals except the two scheduled for 2008 and 2013, which are six 
percent. Thus. four goals of seven percent (twenty-eight percent), plus two goals of six percent 
(twelve percent) equal forty percent. Supra tbl. I. 
52. Supra tbl. I. 
53. Wyoming and Maine share the same starting point (thirty-five percent) for intermediate/ 
middle school reading. !d. Figure 2 illustrates data displayed in Table I. 
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Figure 2: Example Versions of the Balloon Schedule 
100 
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80 
1:: 70 Q) 
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40 
30 
20 
02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 II 12 13 14 
Year 
• Wyoming Mid-School Reading Goals from Table I 
Maine Mid-School Reading Goals from Table 1 
Wyoming's and Maine's proficiency goals, like those of Georgia, 
also employ the Balloon Schedule, putting the majority of the desired 
growth in the second half of the timeline. Wyoming's plan sets six equal 
intermediate goals for 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. Maine's 
schedule similarly opts for eight equal intermediate goals with most 
scheduled at the timeline's end. These and any other such versions ofthe 
Balloon Schedule run contrary to the "continuous and substantial" and 
"equal increments" provisions of NCLB. 54 
D. How States Obtained Approval for the Balloon Schedule: 
The Education Department's Misreading of NCLB 
Despite the Act's clarity in forbidding the Balloon Schedule, the 
Education Department has allowed states to use it. 55 How has the 
Department justified doing so? Quite simply, the Department approved 
the Balloon Schedule by misinterpreting the clear "equal increments" 
statutory language analyzed above. An Education Department press 
release states "[ w ]bile states have to ensure that their intermediate goals 
increase in equal increments over the NCLB timeline, states have great 
54. See supra sec. I. B. 
55. See supra n. 30 and accompanying text. 
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flexibility in determining how often their intermediate goals increase. 
States can raise their intermediate goals every year or every two or three 
56 years." 
The key phrase in this press release is "how often." In the 
Department's view, states may backload proficiency gains, so long as 
their intermediate goals are quantitatively equal to each other. Increases 
may each equal ten percent, or 15 percent, or some other number. But 
states can backload gains by selecting how often such increases occur. 
Georgia, Wyoming, and Maine, as described above, 57 have each planned 
most of their equal increases for the timeline's second halrg -which has 
the same effect as timing all increases consistently and making later 
increases larger. Interestingly, the Education Department's interpretation 
of the Act would not allow states to make later increases larger than 
earlier increases, but it does allow the functional equivalent of doing so 
by letting states plan a larger number of equal increases in later phases of 
the schedule. The Department does not read the phrase "over the NCLB 
timeline" to mean that increases should be equal over time and therefore 
does not regulate the timing or rate of progress. This places few, if any, 
constraints on when equal increases may take place, because it has 
allowed backloading. The Education Department's view then arguably 
contravenes NCLB's provisions. As such, the Balloon Schedule is 
inconsistent with any plausible interpretation of "continuous and 
substantial" progress in "equal increments"59 over time. 
E. Did Congress Allow For an Accelerated Growth Interpretation of' 
NCLB? 
Some Balloon Schedules state claims in their accountability 
workbooks that student proficiency will accelerate in later years, "after 
teachers are given time to align their instruction with academic content 
standards, after districts are given the opportunity to increase their 
capacity to support needed reforms, and after there is a highly qualified 
teacher in every ... classroom."60 Michigan anticipates acceleration in 
56. U.S. Dept. Educ., Charting the Course States Decide Major Prm·isions under No Child 
Lefi Behind, http://www.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/2004/0 I /0 1142004.html#elemcnts (Jan. 14, 
2004) (emphasis added). This same section of the press release pointed to some balloon strategies to 
show NCLB's "flexibility." !d. 
57. See supra sec. I. C. 
58. See supra tbl. I. 
59. See supra sec. I. B. 
60. See Cal. Dept. Educ., State of CalijiJrnia Consolidated S'tate llpplimtion llccountahility 
Workbook 30, http://www.ed.gov/admins/lcad/account/stateplans03/cacsa.pdf (amended Aug. 23, 
2005); see also Peter McWalters, Rhode [,fond f)<'partment of' h'ducation Consolidated State 
Application Accountahi/ity Workhook 30, http://www.cd.gov/admins/lcad/account/stateplans03/ 
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proficiency for these reasons and because it expects educational norms to 
change: "These shared norms and expectations require a significant 
investment in the knowledge and skills of teachers in low-performing 
schools and school districts before the most substantial improvement 
gains will be realized." 61 
Some education research can be stretched to support the notion that 
schools' proficiency ~rowth can accelerate in the later years of an 
accountability system. 2 Teacher and school quality both exert some 
influence on student performance. 63 Thus, if these variables improve at 
an accelerated rate, as some Balloon Schedule states claim they will, 64 
then it would be reasonable to expect student performance also to 
accelerate. 65 In these circumstances, back loading may be theoretically 
sound. Nevertheless, this theory of accelerated proficiency growth, even 
if accepted, is simply not allowed by the Act's language, nor should it be 
unquestioningly accepted on its own merits. 
As discussed above, Congressional intent is reflected in the Act's 
language, which prohibits backloading. 66 The Senate conference 
members who explained the final version of NCLB to the Senate in 
December 2001 disparaged backloading as both prohibited by the Act 
and as unrealistic. When Senator Joseph Lieberman explained what the 
"conferees intend" regarding "this system of setting [the] progress bar 
and raising it in equal increments over a 12-year period," he spelled out 
that "[i]t will further ensure that state plans outline realistic timelines for 
ricsa.pdf (revised July 2004 ). 
61. Mich. Dept. Educ., Michigan Consolidated State Application Accountability Workbook 
28, http://www.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplans03/micsa.pdf (amended June 2005). 
62. Se<' g<'nerallv Harold Wenglinsky, How Schools Matter: The Link between Teacher 
Classroom Practices and Stud!'nt Academic PerfiJrmance, 10 Educ. Policy Analysis Archives 12 
(Feb. 13, 2002), http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v I On 12/ (The abstract of the article observes that "the 
effects of classroom practices, when added to those of other teacher characteristics, are comparable 
in size to those of student background, suggesting that teachers can contribute as much to student 
learning as the students themselves."). Therefi)fe, if California, Rhode Island, and Michigan arc 
correct that their overall school quality improvement (and related factors) will accelerate over time, 
see supra nn. 60-61 and accompanying text, student performance could conceivably accelerate also. 
See genaallv Linda Darling-Hammond, Teacher Quality and Student Achievement: A Review of' 
State Policv Eo' vidence, 8 Educ. Policy Analysis Archives I (Jan. I, 2000), 
http://cpaa.asu.edu/epaa/v8nl/; Dan Goldhaber, The Mvsterv of' Good Teaching, 2 Educ. Next 50,52 
(2002) (available at http://www.cducationnext.org/20021 /50.html) (finding that "high quality 
teachers raise student performance" and that teacher characteristics alone account for 8.5 percent of 
the variation in student achievement); Larry E. Suter, Is Student Achievement Immutable? Evidence 
.fYom fnternalional Siudil's on Schooling and Student Achievement, 70 Rev. Educ. Research 529 
(2000). 
63. S"" id. 
64. See e.g. supra nn. 60 61 and accompanying text. 
65. Se<' supra nn. 60-62 and accompanying text. 
66. See supra sec. 1.13. 
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getting to proficiency, and prohibits states from 'backloading' their 
expected proficiency gains in the out years."67 This statement suggests 
the Senate conference members, therefore, did not consider backloading 
to be "realistic." In fact, the Congressional Record publishes no 
legislator's views to the contrary. 68 Congress intended to forbid plans 
based on accelerated proficiency growth. 
Second, this accelerated growth justification for the BaBoon 
Schedule should not be unquestioningly accepted on its own merits. The 
education literature that can be stretched to support this acceleration 
theory at best bolsters the Balloon Schedule's legitimacy only indirectly, 
if at all. 69 It is not clear, for instance, why accumulated improvements in 
school quality, teacher quality, curriculum alignment with content 
standards, and educational norms would accelerate rather than increase at 
a constant, linear rate. 70 Even if some schools could accelerate 
performance results, research by noted education scholar Richard 
Rothstein suggests that solutions to rapidly accelerated performance 
results are not generally applicable to all schools. 71 
F. Other Evasion Devices 
1. Selection of Minimum Subgroup Sizes 
States have used other devices in addition to the BaBoon Schedule to 
improve their NCLB statistics, including the selection of minimum 
subgroup sizes. More than a dozen states have excluded disadvantaged 
student subgroups from their accountability reports by raising the 
minimum number of students that must be in a subgroup before it is 
tracked for accountability purposes. 72 For example, one Maryland school 
67. 147 Cong. Rec. Sl3403 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2001) (statement of Sen. Lieberman) 
(emphasis added). 
68. See id. 
69. For examples of this literature, see supra n. 62 and accompanying text. 
70. Although the literature cited supra in note 62 supports the notion that teacher and school 
quality affect student learning, they do not specifically state that student learning or teacher and 
school quality have any tendency (or capability) to improve at an accelerated rate. The claim that 
any of these can improve at an accelerated rate is derived not from the scholarly literature cited 
supra in note 62 but by certain states' own accountability workbooks. E.g. supra nn. 60-61 and 
accompanying text. 
71. ,)'ee Richard Rothstein, Class and Schools: Using Social, Economic, and Educational 
RejiJrm to Close the Black-White Achievement Gap, 72-83 (Econ. Policy lnst. 2004). 
72. See Erpenbach et a!., supra n. 30, at 34-35 ("Some States (e.g., Nebraska, Oklahoma, 
Ohio, Wisconsin) have established higher minimum 'n's' for accountability determinations with 
SWDs [students with disabilities] subgroups."); id. at 52 (noting that this strategy has a "long-term 
impact on the number of schools and districts identified for improvement"). For statutory provisions 
relevant to minimum subgroup sizes, see 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (b)(2)(C)(v)(ll)(dd), (b)(2)(1)(ii), 
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has alreadl failed to make A YP "because its 10 special education 
students" 7 failed to test proficiently, while in the same year a Virginia 
school made A YP "despite its 24 special education students' failing to 
make A YP. The difference? The minimal group size for reporting was 
five in Maryland and 50 in Virginia."74 As this example shows, disabled 
students can easily cause an entire school to fail A YP because their test 
results are counted separately. With so much riding on subgroups' test 
performance, it is not surprising that states are exercising some strategic 
discretion in determining minimum subgroup sizes. 
Although subjective motives cannot be determined with certainty, 
some states' actions seem problematic in the light of observable data. In 
2004, for example, Washington State raised the minimum subgroup size 
for disabled students and limited English proficiency speakers, but for no 
other subgroups, from thirty to forty. 75 As a result, any Washington 
school with thirty-nine or fewer disabled students will not separately be 
held accountable for the test performance of these students. Oddly, 
Washington waited until two years into the NCLB timeline to raise the 
minimum size for only the disabled and limited English $peakers. New 
Jersey acted identically with respect to the disabled by increasing its 
minimum subgroup size for disabled students from twenty to thirty-five, 
also in the year 2004. Had this increase been in place in 2003, it would 
have dramatically cut the number of schools failing to make A YP. 76 In 
fact, one New Jersey newspaper estimates the number of such schools in 
the hundreds. 77 If Washington and New Jersey were indeed 
manipulating their minimum subgroup sizes, they arguably transgressed 
the Act's commands. 
In setting subgroup sizes, NCLB mandates that states consider only 
whether a given size effectuates the collection of reliable information and 
ensures student anonymity. 78 Outside of reliability or anonymity 
(b)(3)(C)(xiii). 
73. Gerald W. Bracey, The 14th Bracev Report on the Condition ofPublic L'ducation, 86 Phi 
Delta Kappan, 149 (Oct. 2004). 
74. !d. 
75. David Wickert, WASL Tweaks Bring Standards within Reach: Scoring Changes: Schools 
to Get lligher Marks. L'ven if Students Don't, Morn. News Trib. (Tacoma, Wash.) A I (Oct. 21, 
2004). 
76. John Mooney, US L'ases Rules on Test Results ./iJr Jersey's Special Fd Students, The 
Star-Lcdger(Newark, N. J.)40(Junc 25, 2004). 
77. Maia Davis, US. Education Department Approves New Jersey·.,. Special Education Plan, 
The Record (Bergen County, N.J.) A4 (June 24, 2004) ("An analysis by The Record (Bergen 
County, NJ), published last month, found that hundreds of schools deemed underperforming last 
year may now escape that label because they have fewer than thirty-tivc special education 
studenb. "). 
78. See 20 U.S.C. ~ 63ll(b)(2)(C)(v)(ll)(dd), (b)(2)(1)(ii), (b)(3 )(C)(xiii). 
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concerns, there is no obvious justification for setting a higher subgroup 
size for the disabled and for limited English speakers than for racial 
minorities or the poor. 79 Washington's and New Jersey's alteration of 
the minimum subgroup sizes only for the disabled and limited English 
speakers seems consistent with a hypothesis of strategic manipulation. 
In 2004, many states, including Alaska, Arkansas, New Jersey, South 
Carolina, and Washington obtained Education Department approval of 
higher minimum subgroup sizes. 80 By granting to states the ability to 
raise minimum subgroup sizes-even in arguably suspicious cases like 
those of Washington and New Jersey-the Education Department has 
invited manipulation. 
2. Confidence Intervals 
81 To improve their NCLB statistics, a majority of states have 
implemented another evasion device-the use of confidence intervals-
which can dramatically increase a state's A YP numbers. 82 To cite an 
extreme example, one Utah newspaper claims that fifty-six percent of all 
Utah schools that made A YP in 2004 did so by using a confidence 
0 1 83 mterva. 
To understand confidence intervals, imagine a typical news poll 
asking a sample group of randomly selected voters whom they will vote 
for in an upcoming election. The various polls, even if conducted in the 
same manner, will tend to disagree somewhat due to random variation in 
the sample groups. s4 But almost all the time, a repeated poll will have 
79. A state might permissibly show that special education students' scores have higher 
variance and therefore a larger group of students is needed to make scores "reliable," if the state can 
also show that the Act's usage of"reliable" calls for a certain level of variance in test scores. For the 
argument that reliability may call for a certain level of variance in test scores, see generally Robert 
L. Linn & Carolyn Haug, Stahility of School-Building Accountahilitv Scores and Gains, 24 Educ. 
Evaluation & Policy Analysis 29 (2002). 
80. See supra nn. 75--77 and accompanying text; Ctr. on Educ. Policy, Rule Changes Could 
Help More Schools Meet Test Score Targets jiJr the No Child Lefi Behind Act 3-4, 9- 10, 
http://www.ctrcdpol.org/nclb/StateAccountabilityPlanAmendmentsReportOct2004.pdf (Oct. 22, 
2004 ). The District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and some states appear interested in doing the same. 
See Diana Jean Schcmo, States' End Run Dilutes BurdenjiJr Special Ed, N.Y. Times AI (June 7, 
2004). 
81. For an overview of confidence interval use as found in states' accountability workbooks, 
see Erpenbach ct aL, supra n. 30, at 21-22. See also Ctr. on Educ. Policy, supra n. 80, at 3 ("About 
half the states had already included the usc of confidence intervals in their original accountability 
plans. Since then, 12 states have either introduced the usc of confidence intervals or changed the way 
they plan to use them to determine A YP."). 
82. See infi·a nn. 149-154 and accompanying text. 
83. Jennifer Toomer-Cook, 114% of Utah Schools Make the Grade on A YP Reports, Descrct 
Morning News (Salt Lake City, Utah) 87 (Dec. 7, 2004). 
84. For this paragraph, sec Study Works Online, Polling: Margin of f:rror, 
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results that fall within a range, called the margin of error. The margin of 
error defines the confidence interval. 85 For example, if fifty percent of 
respondents in a poll say they will vote for Candidate A, and the margin 
of error is eight percent, then the repeated poll will almost always 
randomly register between fifty-eight and forty-two percent support for 
Candidate A. Fifty-eight to forty-two percent is the confidence interval. 
States are using this statistical technique to cushion their schools' 
A YP results with a margin of error. 86 A recent New York Times report 
offered the following example of how a confidence interval may affect 
A YP results in practice: A state opts for a confidence level that results in 
a twenty-three percent margin of error for a small "sample"87 size of 
thirty minority students. 88 The potential effect of the confidence interval 
"is significant, if seemingly technical: For a class of 30 minority students 
at a school where 40 percent of each group must pass a given exam, the 
[confidence interval] cushion grants the school victory if only 17 percent, 
89 
or 5 rather than 12 students, succeed." 
Suppose in the above example that this hypothetical school's 
subgroup achieves exactly seventeen percent proficiency (and fails 
twenty-three percent short of the AMO of forty percent). The 
justification for considering the school compliant is that its students' 
inadequate scores were the result of random variation in the "sample" of 
students. 90 The state may claim that another "sample" of students from 
the same population would have met the AMO. 91 Failure, then, was not 
the school's fault but the result of the random variation in the student 
http :1 /www .studyworkson I inc.com/cda/content/artic le/0, EX P545 _N A V2-76_SA R542,00 .shtml 
(accessed Feb. 23, 2006). 
85. See gem·rally Mario F. Triola, Elementary Statistics 284-302 (6th ed., Addison-Wesley 
Publg. Co. 1995). 
86. For an overview of how confidence intervals in the A YP context work, see generally 
ASR-CAS Jt. Study Group on Adequate Yearly Progress & Scott Marion et al., Making Valid and 
Reliable Decisions in Determining Adequate Yearlv Progress 65-67 (Council of Chief St. Sch. 
Officers 2002) [hercinatler Marion et al.] (available at 
http://www .ccsso.org/contentlpdfs/ A YPpaper.pdt). 
87. Quotes are put around the word "sample" because students are not samples in the NCLB 
system. See infra n. 90 and accompanying text. 
88. See Schcmo, supra n. 80. 
89. !d. 
90. Of course, students generally arc not randomly assigned to schools and so cannot be 
considered a "random sample." Further. school populations within the Act's A YP framework are not 
really "samples" either because every student (not a mere sample of students) is supposed to be 
tested. See Schemo, supra n. 80 ("In addition, some statisticians ... question the validity of using 
confidence intervals for this purpose. The cushions arc most otlen used to allow for variations in 
statistical sampling, but schools are reporting on actual students. not samples of them." (emphasis 
added)). 
91. See generally Linn & Haug, supra n. 79, at 29-36. 
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sample. If they rely on confidence intervals heavily enough, schools 
using a confidence interval may never actually have to reach I 00 percent 
student proficiency, because they can always subtract the margin of error 
from 100 percent and be considered compliant. 92 This use of confidence 
intervals arguably compromises the Act's goals because the mandate of 
NCLB-that every public school student will test proficiently by 
201493 -is rendered unnecessa~. NCLB nowhere authorizes confidence 
intervals or anything like them. 4 Their use came about as a result of the 
Education Department's <Erocess of reviewing and approving state 
accountability workbooks. 5 
In short, the Balloon Schedule clearly violates NCLB. The selection 
of minimum subgroup sizes and the use of confidence intervals also 
arguably violate the Act. 
II. WHY HAVE STATES AND THE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT ADOPTED 
THE BALLOON SCHEDULE? 
A. A Brief Overview ofNCLB 's Sanctions 
States using the Balloon Schedule help their schools avoid NCLB's 
severe sanctions for failing to make A YP. When a school falls short of 
A YP for two consecutive years, the school district must identify it for 
"school improvement."96 Students in such a school receive the option to 
transfer to another school within the school district, 97 with transportation 
costs paid by the school district. 98 With the technical assistance of the 
92. See e.g Angela Pascopella, Did the Tail Wag Dog? (Inside the Law: Ana(vzing, Debating 
and /Lrplaining No Child Leji Behind) 41 Dist. Admin. 123 (Jan. 2005). 
93. See supra n. 2 and accompanying text. 
94. See Marion et a!., supra n. R6, at 72 ("[T]hc law does not mention confidence intervals at 
all."); E-mail from Terri Duggan Schwartzbeck, Policy Analyst, Am. Assn. of Sch. Adminstrs., to 
the author (June 28, 2004) (copy on file with author). 
95. See id. 
96. 20 U.S. C. ~ 6316(b)( I )(A) ("[A] local educational agency shall identify for school 
improvement any elementary school or secondary school served under this part that fails, for 2 
consecutive years, to make adequate yearly progress as defined in the State's plan under section 
63ll(b)(2) of this title."). 
97. !d. at§ 6316(b)( I )(E)(i) ("In the case of a school identified for school improvement under 
this paragraph, the local educational agency shall, not later than the first day of the school year 
following such identification, provide all students enrolled in the school with the option to transfer to 
another public school served by the local educational agency."). 
98. !d. at§ 6316(b)(9) ("'n any case described in paragraph (I )(E) for schools described in 
paragraphs (I )(A), (5), (7)(C)(i), and (8)(A). and subsection (c)( I O)(C)(vii) of this section, the local 
educational agency shall provide, or shall pay for the provision of, transportation for the student to 
the public school the student attends."). 
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school district and after a possible review of the school's data, 99 the 
failing school must develop and implement a two-year plan to 
improve. 10° Failure to achieve A YP for three years triggers intensified 
h I d. . . 101 sc oo 1stnct assistance. 
If a school fails to meet A YP for a fourth consecutive year it may be 
subject to "corrective action." 102 Such action "might include replacing 
school personnel, instituting a new curriculum, extending the school 
year, ... authorizing students to transfer to hifilher-performing schools[,]" 
or a reduction in funding to the target school. 3 
Finally, if "corrective action" does not cause the school to make 
A YP after another full year, 104 the school becomes subject to 
"restructuring." 105 The school district must pick an option from the law's 
restructuring menu, including: 
(I) Reopening the school as a public charter school; 
(2) Replacing school staff"relevant" to the school's failure; 
(3) Hiring a private company to run the school; 
(4) Turning the school over to the state government to run. 106 
The Act also contains a catchall phrase allowing the use of additional 
types of restructuring that would be effective. 107 
As a school passes from improvement to corrective action to 
restructuring, the sanctions for failure to achieve A YP grow 
"increasingly harsh." 108 It is not surprising that states would wish to help 
their schools avoid these sanctions by any means available, including the 
Balloon Schedule and other evasions of the Act. 
99. !d. at § 6316(b)(2) ("Before identifying an elementary school or a secondary school for 
school improvement under paragraphs (I) or (5)(A), for corrective action under paragraph (7), or for 
restructuring under paragraph (8), the local educational agency shall provide the school with an 
opportunity to review the school-level data, including academic assessment data, on which the 
proposed identification is based."). 
I 00. !d. at § 6316(b )(3 ). 
101. !d. at§ 6316(b)(5). 
I 02. !d. at § 6316(b )(7) (defining corrective action). 
I 03. Cory Shindel, Student Author, One Standard Fits Alf? Defining Achievement Standards 
for Students with Cognitive Disabilities within the No Child Le.fi Behind Act's Standardized 
Framework, 12 J.L. & Policy 1025, 1044--45 (2004). 
104. 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(8)(A). 
105. !d. 
I 06. !d. at§ 6316(b)(8)(13). 
107. !d. 
I 08. Ryan, supra n. 25, at 933. 
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B. NCLB 's Unrealistic Goals Pressure States to Adopt Evasion 
Strategies 
The true underlying problem may be that NCLB's timeline and 
goals, though laudable in their intent, do not derive from sound research. 
Nearly all education experts see NCLB's 100 percent ~roficiency goal 
and its time line as unrealistic 109 or even malignant. 1 To reach full 
proficiency by 2014, states must maintain significant proficiency growth 
Ill for up to twelve years, but there appears to be no "state that's 
sustained a growth of 5 percent a year over 5 years, let alone I 2." 112 
Indeed, "a large number of independent scholars have demonstrated that 
it is not ?Jossible to have 100 percent of students achieve a high 
standard." 13 
Studies simulating student performance based on past test results 
also paint a glum picture. "With few exceptions, the State simulation 
studies show that a high proportion of schools will likely not meet the 
new A YP requirements within two or three school years." 114 Even if 
states calculate A YP using statistical methods that eliminate smaller 
schools from their accountability reports, "almost all schools will end 
identified for improvement within five or six years." 115 Tellingly, 
education scholar Abigail Thernstrom, a prominent Republican and a 
George W. Bush appointee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 116 
I 09. See W. James Popham, Presentation, Ruminations Regarding NCLB 's Most Malignant 
Provision: Adequate Year(v Progress 2, (D.C., July 28, 2004) (available at http://www.cep-
dc.org/pubs/Forum28July2004/RuminationsReNCLI3-A YP-ss-071488.pdf) (referring to "the 
outlandish unrealism of the [NCLI3's] adequate yearly progress (A YP) provisions," and specifying 
that "NCLB currently calls for schools to produce unrealistic increases in the test scores of 
successive cohorts of students."); Marion et a!., supra n. 86, at 12 ("In a number of cases, the 
proficient level has been set so high [by the state] that it may be completely unrealistic to expect all 
students to reach that level by 20 14"). 
110. Popham, supra n. 109, at I (referring in the title to NCLB's adequate yearly progress 
requirements as "[m]alignant"). SeeM. Hayes Mizell, From Muck to Mountaintop, 33 J.L. & Educ. 
261, 261 (2004) ("A friend of mine who is a charter school administrator characterizes the law's 
application and compliance provisions as 'draconian and bordering on the sadomasochistic.'"). 
Ill. See supra tbl. I. 
112. Diana Jean Schema, Sidestepping of New School Standards [,, Seen, N.Y. Times A21 
(Oct. 15, 2002). 
113. William J. Mathis, No Child l.efi B!.'hind Act: What Will It Cost States:' 77 Spectrum: J. of 
St. Govt. 8 (Apr. I, 2004 ). See Goldberg, supra n. 36 ("[T]he fact is that no large city, state, or 
country~other than mythical Lake Wobegon--- has ever produced an entire population of students 
who are above average."). 
114. Marion et a!., supra n. 86, at 64. 
115. !d. at 65. 
116. See genera/tv Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, Ahigail Thernstrom 
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/thcrnstrom~a.htm (accessed Feb. 23, 2006) (providing 
biographical data about Abigail Thcrnstrom). 
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dismisses the suggestion that all students can achieve a "Proficient" 
rating on her state's tests-or even a "Basic" rating on the National 
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), a national proficiency 
117 Th c h . . . "I d. " h 1 test. e 10rmer s e cntlc1zes as u 1crous, t e atter as 
"utopian." 118 
So far, A YP statistics arc not encouraging. Of the nation's 91,400 
public schools, approximately 26,000 (28.4 percent) failed to make A YP 
in the school year ending in 2003. 119 Nearly all states set their AMOs 
1 . 2003 h . . . 120 very ow m -at t e1r startmg pomts. 
One can only guess how quickly schools will fail to make A YP as 
intermediate goals come due. One study predicts that by 2014, ninety-
nine rercent of California public schools will have failed to make 
A YP. 21 The Connecticut Education Association estimates that "[ m ]ore 
than 90% of Connecticut elementary and middle schools won't meet 
federal education standards in 10 years." 122 Researchers forecast that by 
2014 "nearly all schools in all states will fail under the law." 123 Relying 
on similar research and facts, education researcher William J. Mathis 
voices doubt about NCLB's core premise that every child can succeed in 
124 the sense contemplated by NCLB. Even some NCLB supporters are 
pessimistic about schools' chances for reaching full proficiency. 125 
117. Abigail Thernstrom, Speech, Comments, in No Child Leji Behind: What Will it Take? 103, 
http://www.edexcellence.net/doc/NCLBreport.pdf (Feb. 2002). For an overview of the National 
Assessment of Educational Progress, see Nat!. Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Overview: What is NAEP? 
http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/about (updated Nov. 25, 2005). 
118. Thernstrom, supra n. 117. 
119. See Goldberg, supra n. 36 ("Approximately 26,000 of the nation's 91,400 public schools 
failed to make A YP in the 2002-03 school year."). 
120. See supra tbl. I. 
121. Bracey, supra n. 73, at 139 ("[T]he projection is for 99'1<• failure by the witching year of 
2014, when I 00% of students must be 'proficient'."). 
122. Associated Press, Study: 9 Out of" 10 Schools Won't Meet Federal Standards in a Decade, 
Hartford Courant I (May 28, 2004). 
123. Diana Jean Schemo, "f/iirl by Bush on Education flits Obstacles, N.Y. Times AI (Aug. 
18, 2004). See also Robert L. Linn, Presentation, Rethinking the No Child Leji Behind Accountability 
s:vstem 3 (D.C., July 28, 2004) (available at http://www.cep-dc.org/pubs/Forum28July2004) 
("[A]lmost all schools will fall short of the adequate yearly progress (A YP) targets within the next 
few years, unless major changes are made in the definition of A YP."). 
124. See Mathis, supra n. I 13. 
125. See e.g. Michael D. Casserly, Speech, Comments, in No Child Leji Behind: What Will it 
Take? 71, http://www.edexcellencc.net/doc/NCLBreport.pdf (Feb. 2002) ("Finally, [NCLB] has a 
strong accountability system that we also backed .... We expect to have a great deal of difficulty 
executing the bill's A YP provisions. . . [O]ur biggest challenge will be getting our instructional 
programs to do what this legislation envisions."). The pro-NCLB Education Trust, an advocacy 
group, released a study in 2004 that emphasized progress in narrowing racial achievement gaps but 
admitted that "the pace of progress was generally insutlicient to reach the goal of full proficiency by 
2014." Michael Dobbs, Kerry Competes to Claim Issue of"RejiJrm, Wash. Post A4 (Oct. 20, 2004) 
(summarizing findings from this study). See Educ. Trust, Measured Progress: Achievement Rises 
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Former Education Secretary Rod Paige, however, has dismissed such 
criticisms and tried to rebut them with positive anecdotes about a few 
schools that have experienced notable success. 126 
The impossibility of complying with NCLB on the merits, combined 
with the harshness of its sanctions, generates the pressure motivating 
states to help their schools evade the Act. 
C. The Functions ofthe Balloon Schedule and Other Devices 
The Balloon Schedule helps states evade NCLB in two ways. First, 
backloading artificially lowers states' AMOs during the first half of the 
Act's timeline. 127 For exam~le, if Georgia had applied South Carolina's 
intermediate goal structure 1 8 of even progress over the Act's timeline, 
Georgia would have scheduled a twenty percent increase in middle 
school reading proficiency by 2008, rather than a thirteen percent 
increase. (The Balloon Schedule thus gives Georgia middle schools a 
seven percent cushion. 129) Due to this cushion, Georgia's middle schools 
with reading proficienc~ increases between thirteen percent and twenty 
percent will artificially 1 0 achieve A YP in reading in 2008. 
Second, if states utilize a Balloon Schedule or similar tactics, they 
have less of an incentive to adopt other evasion strategies. For instance, 
the cushion Georgia schools gain by using the Balloon Schedule reduces 
pressure to further embellish student proficiency. 
D. The Federal Government's Interest in Approving the Balloon 
Schedule 
The Balloon Schedule and the other evasion strategies inflate the 
number of schools making A YP, creating the appearance of school 
improvement and NCLB success, for which the federal government 
(especially the Education Department) may take credit. President George 
W. Bush and former Education Secretary Rod Paige both lauded 
NCLB's supposed "success" during the 2004 presidential election 
and Gaps Narrow, but Too Slowly 1-8, 
http:/ /www2 .edtrust.org/edtrust/images/MeasurcdProgress.doc . pdf (Oct. 2004). 
126. See e.g. Rod Paige, Speech, Remarks of' Secretarv Paige '1!,1 24-26 (The Educ. Writers 
Assoc. 2002 Annual Seminar, Apr. 27, 2002) (available at http://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/2002/ 
04/20020427.html). 
127. Such inflation is "artificial" to the extent that something other than genuine student 
improvement causes it, and such improvement is over and above what the state would accomplish 
while complying with the Act (i.e., by not using a Balloon Schedule). 
128. See supra tbl. I. 
129. The seven percent cushion is relative to a stair-step intermediate goal structure. 
130. On the meaning of"artificial" as used here, see supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
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season.
131 For example, former Secretary Paige's address at the 2004 
Republican National Convention urged voters to reelect President Bush 
on the basis ofNCLB's proven results: "Ladies and gentlemen, No Child 
Left Behind is working .... Only one candidate has created an education 
system worthy of a great nation: President George W. Bush." 132 This 
logic, however, cuts in both directions. Without ostensible successes in 
education, NCLB will look like a failure, and the federal government 
will absorb the blame. The Balloon Schedule and other evasion devices 
help ensure that NCLB redounds to the government's credit. 133 
President Bush and former Education Secretary Rod Paige have 
taken much credit for ostensible improvement in schools since the Act's 
passage. 134 Bush Administration officials t(fsically have claimed success 
by saying that test scores have gone up. 5 Both President Bush and 
former Secretary Paige point to improved math scores of fourth- and 
eighth-graders from 2000 to 2003 on a nationwide proficiency test, 136 
the NAEP. 137 Similarly, Paige's successor, Secretary Margaret 
Spellings, attributed gains in reading on the NAEP among nine-year-olds 
"138 between I 999 and 2004 to NCLB. On the other hand, there was no 
131. See e.g. George W. Bush, Speech, Remarks hy the President at Victmy 201)4 Rally 
(Oshkosh, Wis., Oct. 15, 2004), in White House Press Releases and Documents (available at 2004 
WL 2558203) [hereinafter Bush, Remarks at Viet my Rally] ("The No Child Left Behind Act is 
working."); Erik W. Robe len, Paige: It's Not Too lo'arly to Call School Law a Success, 24 Educ. 
Week 23 (Oct. 6, 2004) (available at 2004 WL 63594841) ("Rod Paige is declaring the No Child 
Left Behind Act a success."). 
132. Rod Paige, Speech, Remarks hy Education Secretary Rod Paige~~ 20, 27 (Republican 
National Convention, Aug. 31, 2004) [hereinafter Paige, Republican National Convention] (available 
at http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/ A50460-2004Aug31.html). 
133. C{: Anne C. Lewis, States Feel the Crunch of' NCLB, 86 Phi Delta Kappan 339 (Jan. 
2005). 
134. See infra nn. 131-158, and accompanying text. 
135. See George W. Bush, Speech, President's Remarks in New Mexico,[ 40 (Alamogordo, 
N.M., Oct. 24, 2004), in White House Press Releases & Documents (available at 2004 WLNR 
3336295) ("We passed the No Child Left Behind Act, which is bringing high standards to our 
classrooms .... We're seeing great progress across this country. Math and reading scores are on the 
rise."); Paige, Republican National Convention, supra n. 132, at~~ 20-21 ("No Child Left Behind is 
working .... All across America, test scores are rising; students arc learning; the achievement gap is 
closing."). See also Bush, Remark\· at Victory Rallv, supra n. 131. 
136. Bush, The Essential Work ofDemocracv, supra n. 26; Rod Paige, Speech, Paige Kicks OfT 
Annual Celebration oj'Historically Black Colleges and Universities~ 18 (Sept. 13, 2004) (available 
at http:/ /www.ed.gov/ncws/speeches/2004/09109132004.html). 
137. Recall that NAEP stands for "National Assessment of Educational Progress." See supra n. 
117. 
138. See U.S. Dept. Educ., Spellings Hails New National Report Card Results, http://www 
.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/2005/07/07142005.html (July 14, 2005) ("Today's Report Card is proof 
that No Child Left Behind is working-it is helping to raise the achievement of young students of 
every race and from every type of family background. . . More than half of the progress in reading 
for 9-year olds during the Report Card's entire history has been made in the last five years. It is not a 
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statistically significant improvement in the average scaled NAEP reading 
scores of thirteen-year-o1ds and seventeen-year-olds over the same 
period (1999-2004). 139 Since NCLB's definition of A YP pivots not on 
the NAEP 140 but on state tests, 141 it is unclear whether NAEP 
proficiency gains are related to the Act. Nonetheless, any increases in 
NAEP scores are a good thing and may be at least partially attributable to 
implementation of the Act. 
In other claims of success, the federal government has sought to take 
credit for some states' artificially 142 inflated progress. "Federal officials 
brag about the reduction in the number of schools failing to make 
adequate yearly progress (A YP) in 2004 in most states, forgetting to 
mention that changes in regulations are more responsible for the assumed 
improvement than any increase in the capacity of states and schools to 
significantly improve student leaming." 14 
As the 2004 presidential election season grew more intense, the 
White House issued a detailed September press release publicizing 
NCLB's supposed successes. 144 Some of these claimed successes have 
undoubtedly been inflated by state evasion strategies. 145 For example, 
the press release noted that in Maryland the "percentage of African-
American third graders scoring in the proficient range on state tests in 
reading increased 16 points in one year,a" and noted similar progress for 
Maryland's Hispanic fifth-graders. 1 6 President Bush similarly 
highlighted these figures. 147 Maryland, however, made its tests easier to 
coincidence that progress accelerated so dramatically during this time period."). 
139. See Nat!. Ctr. Educ. Statistics, National Trends in Reading hy Average Scale Scores, 
http:!/ nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/ltt/results2004/nat-reading-scalcscore.asp (last updated July 6, 
2005). ("Thirteen-year-olds. The average score in 2004 was higher than the average score in 1971, 
but no difference from the average score in 1999 was found.") ("Scventeen-ycar-olds. There was no 
statistically significant difference between average scores in 1999 and 2004"). 
140. See Linn, supra n. 123 ("[T]he use of state-level NAEP results arc not specified in the 
law .... "). 
141. The President and former Secretary Paige also do not claim that this progress was fast 
enough to result in full proficiency by 2014. In fact, this progress is much too slow. 
142. On the meaning of"artificial" as used here, see supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
143. Lewis, supra n. 133. 
144. See George W. Bush, Education: The Promise of' America, ~ 3, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/ news/rcleascs/2004/09/20040926.htm1#3 (Sept. 26, 2004 ). 
145. See supra n. 143 and accompanying text; infi·a nn. 148--158 and accompanying text. 
Perhaps some of these supposed successes present some genuine student improvement, and the Act 
may have facilitated some gains. Nevertheless, some of these supposed signs of success are artificial. 
146. See supra n. 144. 
147. See Bush, The Essential Work of' Democracy, supra n. 26 ("In Maryland, the percentage 
of African American third-graders who are reading proficiently increased 16 percentage points in 
one year. The percentage of Hispanic fifth-graders achieving proficiency in math increased nearly I 0 
percentage points. And 25 schools exited school improvement status this year after meeting their 
performance objectives."). 
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pass for 2004, 148 and thus some of Maryland's improvement should be 
attributed to its easier tests. 
The White House press release similarly pointed to North Carolina's 
increase in the percentage of schools achievin~ A YP, from forty-seven 
percent in 2003 to seventy percent in 2004. 14 At least some of these 
gains, however, derive from North Carolina's use of a confidence 
interval to calculate A YP. If North Carolina had used its confidence 
interval to calculate A YP in 2003, "about 200 more schools would have 
hit the [A YP] mark, raising the state's success rate from 47 percent to 57 
percent." 150 The statistical legerdemain for 2004 has turned out to be 
stunningly higher than fifty-seven percent; a startlingly high seventy 
percent of North Carolina's schools achieved A YP, partially due to its 
use of a confidence interval. 151 
The press release also cites similar improvement in 2004 in 
Pennsylvania, a state that, like North Carolina, adopted a confidence 
interval in 2004. 152 Pennsylvania saw a nineteen percent increase in the 
proportion of schools making A YP in 2004 (from sixty-two to eighty-one 
153 B . f h. . . percent). ut sixteen percent o t IS mneteen percent Im~rovement 
occurred "because of the addition of a confidence interval." 1 4 In other 
words, eighty-four percent of increase in the proportion of Pennsylvania 
schools that made A YP in 2004 derived from the use of a confidence 
interval to calculate A YP. Pennsylvania has also adopted a Balloon 
Schedule 155 which artificially 156 lowers its early AMOs. The .press 
release points to the A YP-related progress of eight other states. 15 But 
half of them (California, Delaware, Georgia, and Wisconsin) adopted the 
Balloon Schedule and therefore currently have artificially low goals. 158 
148. See infra nn. 187-188 and accompanying text (observing that Maryland's 2004 test scores 
may show illusory gains in proficiency because the state lowered its testing standards). 
149. See supra n. 144. 
I 50. Ann Doss Helms, Many More Schools Expected to Meet Goals; But Those That Fail Must 
Let Students Tran.\fcr Out, Charlotte Observer I B (July 19, 2004). 
I 5 I See Emily S. Achenbaum, Union County Schools Show Improvement, Charlotte Observer 
6U (July 22, 2004); Lynn Olson, Data Show Schools Making Progress on Federal Goals, 24 Educ. 
Week (Sept. 8, 2004) ("In North Carolina, 70 percent of schools met all federal A YP goals in 2003-
04, up from 47 percent in 2002-03. That difference can be traced in part to the federal government's 
giving the state permission to use a 'confidence interval' . . ."). 
152. See Pa. Dept. Educ., Adequate Yearly Progress 20113-114 Changes, 
http://www.pde.state.pa .us/pas/cwp/view.asp?a=3&q=104800 (accessed Feb. 13, 2005). 
I 53. See Olson, supra n. 151. 
!54. /d. (quoting state director for assessment and accountability Carina Wong). 
155. See supra tbl. I. 
I 56. On the meaning of"artificial" as used here, see supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
I 57. See supra n. 144. 
I 58. See supra table I for the AMO schedules of California, Delaware, Georgia, and 
Wisconsin. West Virginia's 2003 Accountability Workbook lacked sufficient information to 
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Although the Education Department has of necessity been modest in 
what it claims as success, taking even this kind of credit will be 
precarious when a larger share of schools fails to make A YP. 159 The 
federal government's interest in evasion strategies can be expected to 
grow stronger in the future when intermediate goals come due and 
further embellishment of A YP results is needed to prove that NCLB is 
"working." 
III. IN DEFENSE OF THE BALLOON SCHEDULE 
A. NCLB Gives States the Right to Define Proficiency Down 
NCLB's approach to state educational standards is out of tune with 
the rest of the Act. When it comes to the twelve-year timeline, the I 00 
percent proficiency goal, and its sanctions, the Act is rule-like. But 
regarding the substance of state educational standards, the Act imposes 
few or no constraints. 160 Noted education law expert Professor James E. 
Ryan has called this inconsistency "regulatory stringency and laxity," 161 
and has observed that it "could well prove disastrous. It will encourage 
states to lower their standards, make their tests easier, or lower the scores 
needed to be deemed proficient." 162 
NCLB includes two sets of educational standards: content standards 
and performance standards. "Content standards define the skills and 
knowledge that all students are expected to obtain and be able to 
demonstrate while performance standards define proficiency levels for 
skills and knowledge." 163 NCLB gives states the right to change, at any 
time, either or both sets of standards. 164 "Nothing in this part," says the 
Act, "shall prohibit a State from revising, consistent with this section, 
categorize its AMO schedule as either a Balloon Schedule or not. 
159. Sec supra sec. 11.8 (noting that most schools will eventually fail to make A YP). 
160. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (b)( I )(D) (providing that "Standards under this paragraph shall 
include-- -(i) challenging academic content standards in academic subjects that--(1) specify what 
children are expected to know and be able to do; (II) contain coherent and rigorous content; and (Ill) 
encourage the teaching of advanced skills; and (ii) challenging student academic achievement 
standards that-(1) are aligned with the State's academic content standards; (II) describe two levels 
of high achievement (proficient and advanced) that determine how well children are mastering the 
material in the State academic content standards; and (Ill) describe a third level of achievement 
(basic) to provide complete information about the progress of the lower-achieving children toward 
mastering the proficient and advanced levels of achievement"). This provision in the Act in no way 
limits states' authority to change or set their standards as they see fit. 
161. Ryan, supra n. 25, at 944. 
162. !d. 
163. See Duran. supra n. 25, at 81. 
164. See 20 U.S.C. ll63 l l(b)( I )(A)-(0). 
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any" educational standard relevant to NCLB. 165 The Act makes it illegal 
for the Education DeFartment to require states to even submit their 
standards for review. 16 
If the Education Department wishes to prevent states from evading 
NCLB by defining proficiency down, it may not do so by diktat. Instead, 
the Department must induce states to voluntarily refrain from defining 
proficiency down-by allowing more effective and more benign 
evasions such as the Balloon Schedule, selection of minimum subgroup 
sizes, and the use of confidence intervals when determining A YP. 
B. E.ffects of Defining Proficiency Down 
Unlike lowering educational standards, the Balloon Schedule, 
selection of minimum subgroup sizes, and confidence intervals have no 
obvious effect on educational standards. These three evasions have been 
created for the sake of NCLB's accountability system. 167 As a result, 
they mainly manipulate A YP numbers that appear on federal 
accountability reports. 
Defining proficiency down, on the other hand, is com~arable to 
grade inflation and directly lowers educational standards. 68 Grade 
inflation occurs when average 9rades rise without a commensurate 
increase in student performance. 69 Defining proficiency down does 
exactly this: it increases the reward for the same level of performance by 
lowering the educational standard. 170 
165. ld at ~ 6311 (b)(l )(F) ("Nothing in this part shall prohibit a State from revising, consistent 
with this section, any standard adopted under this part before or after January 8, 2002."). 
166. ld at § 6311(b)(l)(A) (providing that "a State shall not be required to submit such 
[academic content] standards to the [Education) Secretary"). 
167. All of these devices are created by provisions in the Act. See supra sees. l.D~l.F. 
168. See infra n. 169 and accompanying text. 
169. See Robert Birnbaum, Factors Related to University Grade Inflation, 48 J. Higher Educ. 
519, 522 (1977) ("In the context of grades, inflation can be viewed as a process in which a defined 
level of academic achievement results in a higher grade than awarded to that level of achievement in 
the past. In plain language, grade inflation implies that it is now 'easier' to get a high grade in a 
course than previously."); Perry A. Zirkel, Grade Inflation: Leadership Opportunity jiJr Schools of 
Education'!, 101 Teachers College Rec. 247, 247 (1999) ("Grade inflation ... is a rise in academic 
grades not accompanied by a commensurate increase in academic achievement."). 
170. It is worth noting that grade inflation does not always cause standards to drop-if grade 
expectations rise at the same rate that average grades do. Instead of educational standards dropping 
in such a case, the symbols representing the standards (and thus the exact same expectations) would 
merely shift upward. For example, if a college's average grade level rose from "C" to "B," 
employers' expectations for graduates' grades might also rise from "C" to "B." The symbols 
representing the grades would have shifted upward, but employers' rising expectations would leave 
the standard unchanged. Some employers and graduate schools today expect to see "high and 
relatively undifferentiated grades, and therefore rely on other criteria." Henry Rosovsky & Matthew 
Hartley, Evaluation and the Academy: Are We Doing the Right Thing? Grade Inflation and Letters 
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When schools lower standards, they discourage higher levels of 
student learning. 171 The predictable result of definin~ proficiency down 
will be that students learn less and perform worse. 1 "[W]hen schools 
through inflated grades promote lowered standards ... students routinely 
perform far below their capability, and they know it." 173 Students "who 
are rewarded regardless of their performance eventually lose respect for 
their teachers and for the subject." 174 Colorado may be a case in point. 
Since it defined proficiency down, Colorado's fourth-grade reading 
175 176 
scores on the NAEP have dropped. 
The Act's proponents understand this point well. According to the 
Education Trust, an advocacy group that supports NCLB, setting 
standards too low "ultimately stunt[s] the academic growth of our young 
people." 177 President Bush has said of NCLB: "We're challenging what 
I call the soft bigotry of low expectations. In other words, if you believe 
certain children can't learn, they won't. It's just as simple as that. If 
you've got low expectations ... you'll achieve mediocre results." 178 
Fonner Education Secretary Rod Paige has similarly stated: "If 
expectations are high, then students will thrive. If expectations are low, 
then they will come to believe they are hopeless causes and they will 
surrender"." 179 One education researcher has even opined that the Act 
of Recommendation 12 (Acad. of Arts & Sciences, 2002). Of course. defining proficiency down for 
purposes of NCLB cannot tit into this relatively benign category of grade inflation because the 
"proficient" label's value is fixed by law. Expectations cannot rise to match lowering standards 
unless NCLB is amended somehow. To be sure, states would want to define proficiency down only 
if it lowered standards, or doing so would not help evade NCLI3. 
171. See William Cole, The Perils of Grade Inflation, Chron. Higher Educ. Bl (Jan. 6, 1993) 
("[B]y rewarding mediocrity, we discourage excellence."). 
172. See Clifford H. Edwards, Grade Inflation: Till! lojfi!Cts on Educational Qua/ill' and 
Personal Well-Being, 120 Educ. 538 (Spring 2000) ("Grade inflation generally promotes lower 
academic standards and gives students a distorted view of their academic achievements and 
abilities." (citations omitted)). 
173. !d. 
174. Gregory Stanley & Lawrence Baines, No More Shopping .fiJr Grades at B-Mart: Re-
establishing Grades as Indicators of Academic PerjiH·mance, 74 Clearing House 227, 22S (Mar. 
2001). 
175. See supra nn. 117, 137 and accompanying text (discussing the NAEP). 
176. Susan Saulny, State to State: Varied Ideas of 'Proficient·, N.Y. Times 13X (Jan. 19, 2005) 
("Colorado's proficiency rate fell to 37 percent on the national test, but that score was high enough 
to rank fifth in the nation."). Of course, this fact alone does not prove that Colorado's lowering of 
standards caused the entire drop, but the drop is consistent with the theory that defining proficiency 
down lowers student achievement. 
177. Educ. Trust, Stalled in Secondary: A Look at Student Achi<'V<'tnent Since the No Child Leji 
Behind Act 2, http://www2.edtrust.org/NR/rdonlyres/77670E50-18RF-4AA8-8729-555115389E 18/0/ 
StalledlnSecondary.pdf (accessed Jan. 23, 2005). 
178. Bush, Remarks, supra n. 27. 
179. Matthews, supra n. 2 7. 
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might never have been needed but for rampant grade inflation. 180 
C. Banning the Balloon Schedule Would Encourage States to Define 
Proficiency Down 
If the Balloon Schedule and its cousins were banned, states would be 
encour'}fled to inflate their proficiency results by defining proficiency 
down. 1 The "pressures to comply" with NCLB have already caused 
some states to "ease their standards for what it means to be 'proficient' in 
reading and math." 182 For example, Colorado, Connecticut, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Texas, Utah, and Washington have made it easier for their 
students to test proficiently. 183 A Utah school curriculum director has 
said that she cannot be sure how much of her school's statistical 
improvement in 2004 derived from the state's lower "cut" scores. 184 
Washington State estimates that four to nine percent more of its seventh-
graders will test proficiently in reading and math in the coming year, as a 
result of a lower "cut" score on its test. 185 An assistant superintendent 
candidly remarked of this change: "The results are going to look like they 
have improved." 186 Maryland also "set easier passing standards [for its 
tests] so that double the percentage of students were deemed 'proficient' 
under the new state tests than were deemed so under the old tests." 187 
According to one editorial writer's assessment of Maryland's higher 
scores in 2004, '"improvements' in test scores may be largely an 
180. See John Stone, Lmving Children Behind; Grade Inflation a Growing Problem, Wash. 
Times A 19 (Aug. 31, 2004). 
181. See Marion et al., supra n. 86, at 13; Sam Dillon, Playing the Standards Game, N.Y. 
Times 2 (May 25, 2003); Sam Dillon, States !Ire Relaxing Education Standards to Avoid Sanctions 
from Federal Law, N.Y. Times A29 (May 22, 2003); David J. Hoff, States Revise the Meaning ol 
'Proficient', Educ. Week, I (Oct. 9, 2002); Erpcnbach eta!., supra n. 30, at 7; No Child Act Leaves 
Many in Perplexity, Lincoln J. Star (Lincoln, Ncb.) (Dec. 3, 2003), (available at 
http:! /www.journalstar.com/ articles/2003/12/03/cditorial,_main_ljs/ I 0041623.txt) (quoting former 
U.S. Education Secretary Rod Paige: "Unfortunately, some states have lowered the bar of 
expectations to hide the performance of their schools."); Gary W. Ritter & Christopher J. Lucas, 
Puzzled States, 3 Educ. Next 54, 60 (2003). See Matthew H. Joseph, ... And in Marvland, Wash. 
Post B8 (Aug. I, 2004); Linda Shaw, Panel Lowers BarfiJr Passing Parts of WASL, Seattle Times 
82 (May I I, 2004 ). 
182. Marion eta!., supra n. 86, at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
183. See Joseph, supra n. 181 (Maryland); Ronnie Lynn, 2 Jordan Schools Fail Feds' Test; 
District Must Pay to Transport Students Who Transfi:r, Salt Lake Trib. C I (Nov. I, 2004); Ryan, 
supra n. 25, at 947-48; David Wickert, WASL Tweaks Bring Standards within Reach; Scoring 
Changes: Schools to Get Hi!',her Marks, Fven if Students Don't, Morn. News Trib. (Tacoma, Wash.) 
AI (Oct. 21, 2004). 
184. Lynn, supra n. 183. 
185. Wickert, supra n. 183. 
186. !d (emphasis added). 
187. Joseph, supra n. I 81. 
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1 uston. 
The states that have lowered their standards are relatively few in 
number-seven, to be exact. 189 Due to the Education Department's 
approval of so many effective methods for inflating A YP numbers, states 
apparently do not feel a great need to lower their standards so far. 
The relatively low number of states defining proficiency may also be 
partially due to the Act's requirement that some students from every state 
take the NAEP. The Act provides that each state's accountability 
workbook must contain assurances that, by the 2002-2003 school year, it 
will "participate in biennial State academic assessments of 4th and 8th 
grade reading and mathematics under" the NAEP. 190 Popularly known 
as "the Nation's Report Card" and administered by a sub-unit of the U.S. 
Department of Education, the NAEP is the "the only nationally 
representative and continuing assessment of what America's students 
know and can do in various subject areas." 191 
The NAEP may help encourage states to keep standards high in the 
following manner: if they lower their standards, states may experience a 
drop in their students' NAEP performance, 192 leading to embarrassment 
and perhaps public criticism of whatever leaders lowered the standards. 
Such consequences appear to be the only incentives supplied by the Act's 
NAEP requirement, because A YP does not account for NAEP scores. 193 
Improvements or drops in NAEP scores alone-holding all other 
variables constant-would have no effect on any school's A YP status. 194 
Thus, while it must be acknowledged that the NAEP does provide some 
incentive, however small, to keep standards high, the Act's 
accountability system pulls strongly in the opposite direction-and 
successfully, if the examples of the seven states that have lowered 
188. !d. 
189. These states are: Colorado, Connecticut, Louisiana, Texas, Utah, Washington, and 
Maryland. See supra n. 183 and accompanying text. It should be noted that M is so uri seems to be 
planning to lower its testing "cut" scores sometime in 2006. See Ltr. from Thomas R. Davis, Pres., 
Mo. Dept. of Elementary and Secondary Educ., to all Missouri Educators, (Feb. 18, 2004) (available 
at http://www.dese.state.mo.us/stateboard/letters/2004/02182004.html) ("The stated goal of NCLB is 
for all children to be proficient in reading and math by 2014. However, the annual testing that is 
required to measure our progress toward that goal will not be available until 2006. At that time all of 
Missouri's definitions (such as 'proficiency') will have to be redone to create new cut scores on the 
annual tests."). The Missouri Board of Education initially declined to lower "cut" scores. See Deann 
Smith, State School Board Maintains Current Testing Standards, Kansas City Star (Apr. 17, 2003) 
(available at http:/ /www.kansascity.com/mld/kansascity/news/local/5649270.htm? I c). 
190. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(c)(2). 
191. Nat!. Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, supra n. 117. 
192. For one possible example of this, see e.g. supra n. 176 and accompanying text. 
193. The Act nowhere incorporates the NAEP into its definition of A YP. See 20 U.S.C. 
6311 (2)(b)( 1 )(BHC) (setting forth the definition of"adequate yearly progress"). 
194. See id. 
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d d . d. . 195 I d d .c. h A ' stan ar s are any m IcattOn. n ee , as pressure trom t e ct s 
accountability system builds, it is easy to imagine states preferring some 
shame and embarrassment from lower NAEP scores to rising numbers of 
schools being subject to improvement, corrective action, and 
• 1"96 
restructurmg. 
Rather than lower education standards, states have thus far much 
preferred to employ the evasion devices blessed by the Education 
Department: the Balloon Schedule, selection of minimum subgroup 
sizes, and confidence intervals. Recall that twenty-two states opted for 
the Balloon Schedule in their 2003 accountability workbooks. 197 A 
majority of states use a confidence interval. 198 Over a dozen states have 
arguably manipulated minimum subgroup sizes, with more considering 
this tactic. 199 But only two of the states that have lowered educational 
standards (Louisiana and Texas) also use the Balloon Schedule?00 It is 
also telling that, of the thirteen states whose governors announced in 
early 2005 their plans to raise educational standards, ten (seventy-seven 
percent) are Balloon Schedule states. 201 In all, about half of all states are 
Balloon Schedule states. 202 
The pressure to define proficiency down, if these other strategies 
were eliminated, could be enormous. For schools in Balloon Schedule 
states, AMOs would immediately jump if the Balloon Schedule were 
banned. Witness Georgia, a state where middle school reading AMOs for 
2006 could soar above currently prescribed levels by as much as seven 
percent. 203 In North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and other states, confidence 
intervals have aided hundreds of schools in making A YP. 204 Likewise, 
without selection of subgroup sizes many schools would fail to make 
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A YP due to their special education students. 205 Any crackdown on these 
strategies would likely contribute to an increase in the number of states 
lowering educational standards beyond its currently modest number of 
206 
seven. 
CONCLUSION 
In an effort to save the No Child Left Behind Act from its own 
unrealistic requirements, the Education Department has allowed states to 
heavily backload planned student proficiency gains, to change minimum 
subgroup sizes in ways that exclude disadvantaged students from 
accountability reports, and to use confidence intervals to calculate A YP. 
Although allowing these evasions may violate the Act, their use is 
arguably the right thing to do because it reduces the incentive for states 
to do something even worse: harmfully define educational proficiency 
down. 
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